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eNet SMART HOME server 2.3.1 (deleteUserAccount) Arbitrary User Deletion

High
Advisory ID
ZSL-2026-5973
Release Date
14 February 2026
Vendor
Gira Giersiepen GmbH & Co. KG, ALBRECHT JUNG GmbH & Co. KG, Insta GmbH - https://www.enet-smarthome.com
Affected Version
2.3.1 (46841), 2.2.1 (46056)
Tested On
GNU/Linux 4.4.15 (ARMv7 revision 5), Jetty(9.2.z-SNAPSHOT)
Summary

Two German specialists in building systems technology are jointly bringing a new, wireless-based smart home system to the market. Gira and JUNG are the companies behind the eNet SMART HOME brand with our subsidiary, INSTA, responsible for developing the system. All three of us are old hands when it comes to building automation, and have a history of connecting buildings in an intelligent way that goes back as far as the 80s. Gira, JUNG and INSTA were part of the group of companies that initiated and founded EIBA (now known as KNX). KNX is the first open global standard for home and building automation. Through KNX, we have decisively shaped the development of intelligent building systems technology – and this wealth of experience has now come together in eNet SMART HOME. The eNet server is the heart of every eNet SMART HOME system and offers end customers the basis for an easy-to-use and secure Smart Home and installation engineers easily understandable and professional commissioning of the system.

Description

The eNet Smart Home system contains an authorization weakness in the deleteUserAccount JSON-RPC method that permits any authenticated low-privileged user (UG_USER) to delete arbitrary user accounts, except for the built-in admin account. The application does not enforce proper role-based access control on this function, allowing a standard user to submit a crafted request specifying another username and have that account removed without elevated permissions or additional confirmation. This enables unauthorized user management actions, leading to denial of service against legitimate users, disruption of operations, and potential concealment of malicious activity.

Proof of Concept
Disclosure Timeline
07.02.2026Vulnerability discovered.
07.02.2026Vendor contacted.
13.02.2026No response from the vendor.
14.02.2026Public security advisory released.
Credits
Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko Krstic
References
Changelog
14.02.2026Initial release
17.02.2026Added reference [2], [3] and [4]